IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA

(MAIN REGISTRY)

AT DAR ES SALAAM

MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL CAUSE NO. 3 OF 2022

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 108(2) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 2(3) OF THE JUDICATURE AND APPLICATION OF LAWS ACT

IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLE 5(2) (c) AND 64(5) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 11(1)(C) OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS ACT

IN THE MATTER OF CHALLENGING THE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON PRISONERS AND REMANDEES AWAITING TRIAL TO REGISTER AND VOTE IN THE GENERAL ELECTIONS

BETWEEN

TITO ELIA MAGOTI.....FIRST PETITIONER
JOHN BONIFACE TULLA.....SECOND PETITIONER

VERSUS

NATIONAL ELECTRAL COMMISSION.....FIRST RESPONDENT
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.....SECOND RESPONDENT
COMMISSION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE.....THIRD RESPONDENT
TANZANIA PRISON SERVICE.....FOURTH RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

15/11/2022 & 19/12/2022

Luvanda, J.:

In this petition, the Petitioners above mentioned, are challenging the restrictions imposed on prisoners and remandees awaiting trial to register and vote in the general election. Specifically, the Petitioners are challenging the provisions of section 11(1)(c) of the National Elections Act, alleging is inconsistent and ultra vires Article 5(2)(c) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (hereinafter to be referred as the Constitution) Cap 2 R.E. 2022. In that it introduces a blanket restrictive eligibility criteria to register for voting and actually voting to all inmates serving the death sentence and to all inmates serving a six months prison sentence, instead of specifying criminal offences for which people may be restricted to vote or be registered as voters.

To buff up their argument, the First Petitioner deposed an affidavit exhibit P3 annexed to the petition, asserting to have been denied his right to vote in the General Election 2020 on account of being confined as remandee at Segerea Prison, awaiting trial in Economic Case No. 137/2019 pending at Kisutu Residential Magistrate's Court from 24/12/2019 to 5/1/2021, despite being a registered voter in the Permanent Voters Register. The Second Petitioner via his affidavit exhibit P2 annexed to the petition, alleged that he was not permitted to vote in the General Election 2020 on account of his state (by that time) as a convict confined at Segerea Prison

as an inmate serving his jail term from 2/1/2020 to 31/12/2020, when he was released.

The Petitioners asserted that upon construction of the provisions of section 11(1)(c) of the National Election Act Cap 343 R.E. 2015, there is no restriction nor disqualification for citizen of Tanzania who are on remand prison awaiting trial to be registered as voters and exercise their rights to vote.

In reply to the petition, the Respondents made a general evasive denial and made a vague statement that the First Respondent has been throughout affording all eligible citizens to exercise their rights to vote in accordance with the law.

In support of the petition, Mr. John Seka learned Counsel for the Petitioners submitted by way of introductory remarks that this Court is expected to strike down an unconstitutional Act of parliament and issue further declaratory orders in its capacity as the guardian of the Constitution, citing Article 64(5) of the Constitution and **Julius Inshengoma Francis Ndyanabo vs Attorney General** (2004) TLR 1. He submitted inrespect of the main petition that under Article 5 (1) of the Constitution has granted to every adult citizen of Tanzania (including those remanded or imprisoned) a right to participate in and vote in an

election. That the right to universal suffrage enrished under Article 5 (1) of the Constitutions is not absolute because it can be restricted by a Parliamentary enactment in the manner and style stated under Article 5(1) of the Constitution. The learned Counsel for Petitioners submitted that the Parliament enacted section 11(1)(c) of the National Elections Act, which does not restrict a right to vote in respect of remandees, rather the right to vote is restricted to persons serving a death sentence as well as to any person serving a prison sentence exceeding six months. It is the contention of the learned Counsel that the Parliament exceeded its mandate and erroneously enacted into the National Elections Act an unconstitutional section 11(1) (c) of the National Elections Act. The learned Counsel cited the extract of Parliamentary Hansard of 6th February, 2015, regarding the official position of the government of Tanzania as far as the right to vote in respect of remandees and prisoners, is concerned. To the wording of the learned Counsel, there is lack of political will to enforce those rights, and urged the court, being the guardian of the constitution to push to act. The learned Counsel cited Article 25 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 21(1) and (3) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Article 2 and 13(1) of the African Charter on Human and People Rights (the African Charter), for a contention that the right to vote is

universal and should not be applied in a discriminative manner. He submitted that the concept of universal suffrage is unreasonably restricted by laws in Tanzania. He also cited **Sunil Batra vs Delhi Administration,** 1980 AIR 1579, 1980 SCR (2) 557; **Francis Coralie Mullin vs The Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi & Others** 1981 AIR 746, 1981 SCR 516; **Priscilla Nyakabi Kanyua vs Attorney General & Another** (2010) EKLR; **Minister of Home Affairs vs National Institute for Crime Prevention** (NICRO) 2004 (5) BCLR 445; **Hirst v UK** (No.2) ECHR 681, for his contention that the constitutional right of every citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process must be statutory restriction on the enjoyment of this right must be looked at suspiciously and justifiable. He submitted that had framers of the constitution considered that the voting right under Article 5(1) of the Constitution should be restricted to all prisoners, they would have stated so clearly. It is his contention that the framers of the constitutions directed the Parliament in enacting the law to effectuate Article 5 (2) had to address prisoners who were convicted of certain specified criminal offences. He submitted that once this Court finds section 11(1) (c) of the National Election Act is inconsistent to Article 5(2) (c) and 64(5) of the Constitution, the only option remaining for the Court is to declare the impugned section void. The learned Counsel submitted that Petitioners

are entitled to general damages Tshs. 50,000,000 each, because were unlawful denied their constitutional right to vote in the 2020 General Elections, which caused them embarrassment, pain suffering, stress, inconvenience. He cited **The Attorney General vs N.I.N Munuo Nguni (2004) TLR 44; Cooer Motor Cooperation Ltd vs Moshi Arusha Occupational Health Services** (1990) TLR 96.

In opposition to the Petition, Ms. Narindwa Sekimanga learned State Attorney submitted the Petitioners have misconstrained and misinterpreted Article 64(5) of the constitution, because the said provision does not give power to this Court to declare void and of no effect any statutory enactment that is inconsistent with the constitution. That the said provision is clear that in any event other law conflict with the provisions contained in the Constitution, then the Constitution shall prevail. The learned State Attorney submitted that section 11(1) (c) of the National Elections Act, Cap 343 R.E 2015, is not inconsistent with Article 5(2) (c) of the Constitution, because section 11(1) (c) clarified the imposed conditions which restrict citizens from exercising the right to vote by reason being under death sentence or under a sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months. She submitted that section or under a sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months. She submitted that section 11(1) (c) should be read together with section 13(1) and (6) of

Cap 343. The learned State Attorney submitted that the First Petitioner has not proved that in 2020 General Election was restricted by the First Respondent to cast his vote because he was a remandee. She submitted that the First Respondent has never restricted eligible citizens who are remandees including the First Petitioner to exercise their rights to vote as long as they have abided with section 13(1) and (6) Cap 343. She submitted that if the Forth Respondent restricted the First Petitioner on his right to vote on 2020 General Elections, that is administrative abuse which has to be remedied by way of judicial review before the High Court by invoking the provision of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Cap 310 R.E 2002, citing **Attorney General vs Disckson Paul Sanga**, Civil Appeal No. 175/2020, page 69; **Rev. Christopher Mtikila vs Attorney General** (1995) TLR 31, page 34. The learned State Attorney submitted that section 11(1) (c) Cap 343 does not restrict remandees awaiting trial not to be registered as voters or to vote in the General Election. The learned State Attorney distinguished **Sunil Batra** (supra), that was centered on prison torture done by a warden to a prisoner, therefore does not relate to the matter at hand; **Priscilla Kanyua** (supra), the issue was whether the constitution of Kenya qualifies the inmates from voting in a referendum; **Minister of home Affairs** (supra) the application was concerned with the right to

vote provided under section 19(3) of the constitution; **Francis Coralie** (supra), is based on the right of prisoners to get reasonable days/hours in a week to meet or being interviewed by their lawyers or members of their family, without many restrictions; **Julius Ishengoma** (supra), is distinguishable because there in the Court of Appeal ruled that the Parliament exceed its powers by enacting the unconstitutional provision of the law. The learned State Attorney submitted that, there is no proof for general damages of 50,000,000 each, for allegation of Petitioners suffered embarrassment, pain, street and inconvenience. That those are special damages which ought to be specifically pleaded and strictly proved, citing **Ami Tanzania Limited vs Prosper Joseph Msele**, Civil case No. 159/2020, page 20; **Finca Microfinance Bank Ltd vs Mohamed Omary Maguyu**; Civil Appeal No. 26/2020 HC Mbeya, Page 10.

In rejoinder, the learned Counsel for Petitioners asked the Court to confirm as not being opposed that remandees have a right to vote.

The learned Counsel asked the Court to declare section 11(1) (c) of Cap 343 void for legislating beyond the prescription set out in Article 5(2) (c) of the Constitution; because framers of the constitution had in mind a list of offences and not a blanket restrictions based on sentence as is the current formulation of section 11(2) (c) Cap 343. The learned Counsel

submitted by distinguishing **Ami Tanzania** (supra), that although stated a clear principle of law, is inapplicable in this case, since there is no special damages pleaded.

Generally speaking, there is no law or rule which restrict remandees awaiting trials, who are confined in remand facility, from registering as voters and also from participant during Election Day. In her reply to the Petitioners submission, the learned Attorney for the Respondents noded in agreement to this proposition. Article 5(1) of the Constitution, provide I quote (Swahili version)

> *'Kila raia wa Tanzania aliyetimiza umri wa miaka kumi na minane anayo haki ya kupiga kura katika uchaguzi unaofanywa Tanzania na wananchi. Na haki hii itatumiwa kwa kufuata masharti ya ibara ndogo ya (2) pamoja na masharti mengineyo ya Katiba hii na ya Sheria inayotumika nchini Tanzania kuhusu mambo ya uchaguzi'*

Under sub-article (2) of Article 5, there is no restriction imposed prohibiting remandees to be registered and participate in the General Election. Equally under section 11(1) of the National Election Act, Cap 343, R.E. 2015, remandees who are awaiting trial, are not among named or listed being unqualified for registration or be registered as a voter or voting.

The first Petitioner asserted to have been denied the right to vote on the general election 2020 on account of being remandee at Segerea Prison. In her reply, the learned Attorney for Respondents submitted that the First Respondent does not and has never restricted eligible citizens who are remandees including the First Petitioner to exercise their rights to vote as long as they have abided with section 13(1) and (6) of the National Elections Act.

However, the evidence of the extract of the Hansard of the Bunge la Tanzania exhibit P1 annexed to the petition, which was unopposed by the Respondents, suggest the contrary. In the said extract of the Hansard of the Bunge la Tanzania, Majadiliano ya Bunge, Mkutano wa Kumi na Nane Kikao cha Kumi, dated 6/2/2015, in the morning session of questions and answers No. 107 was appertaining to rights to vote in respect of inmate and remandees, as to why they are not permitted to vote. The Minister at the Office of the Prime Minister, Policy and Coordination of Parliament, was captured to provide the following answer, I quote in verbatim,

> *'Mheshimiwa Spika, kwa niaba ya Waziri Mkuu napenda kujibu swali la Mheshimiwa Ezekiel Dibogo Wenje, kama ifuatavyo:-*
>
> *Ibara ya 1(5) (sic, 5(1) ya Katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania ya mwaka 1977, inafafanua*

kuwa kila raia wa Tanzania aliyetimiza umri wa miaka 18 anayo haki ya kupiga kura katika uchaguzi unaofanywa Tanzania.

Hata hivyo, kwa mujibu wa Ibara ya 5(2) ya Katiba hiyo na sheria za Uchaguzi, wafungwa wenye vifungo kuanzia miezi sita na kuendelea hawaruhusiwi kupiga kura.

Mheshimiwa Spika, Serikali kupitia Tume ya Taifa ya Uchaguzi, imeshaanza kufanya utafiti na mazungumzo na taasisi zinahohusika na kundi la wafungwa chini ya miezi sita na mahabusu ili kuweka utaratibu mzuri wa kuwawezesha kushiriki katika mchakato wa Uchaguzi kuanzia kuandikishwa katika Daftari la Kudumu la Wapiga Kura na kushiriki kwenye zoezi zima la uchaguzi'

In view of the above, it can be said therefore that, the practice of denying remandees above the age of eighteen years, their constitution right to vote, if at all is there, is not backed by any law or rule. Basically the right to vote in respect of remanded awaiting trial, is a constitutional right. Besides that, there is no provision of the law which qualify it, or say there must be arrangement of procedure for this right to be exercised or enjoyed.

In the petition, the Petitioners stated that they are not aware of any concrete steps taken by the First and Fourth Respondents to allow remandees inmate who are awaiting trail (sic, trial) from registering as

voters and also from voting during Election Day despite promises to change the law in the National Assembly in (sic, on) 6/2/2015.

But as depicted above, neither the Constitution nor the National Elections Act, forbid remandees to be registered and to participate on voting. As I have said above, the right to vote in respect of remandees aged above eighteen years, is a constitutional right, meaning is a legally enforceable right for remandees awaiting trial to participate on the entire process of the general election and other elections conducted from time to time, in so far as registering and voting is concerned. My premises are grounded on a fact that, there is no law or rule which import a room for deliberation or discretion on whether or not this right can be exercised.

If I can borrow the aspiration from the Interim Constitutional Disputes Resolution Court of Kenya, in **Priscilla Nyokabi Kanyua vs Attorney General and Another** [2010] eKLR found at http://kenyalaw.org/caselaw/cases/view/67992/, held,

> *'On the balance of proportionality, we hold that there is no legitimate government objective or purpose that would be served by denying the inmate the right to vote in a referendum. The Njoya Case has demonstrated that the people's constituent rights to vote in a referendum is a basic human right. A right that ushers in or refuses to*

usher in a new Constitution. A constituent power higher than the Constitution and the National Assembly and Presidential Election Act. Can the Constitution and the national Assemly and Presidential Act Cap 7 prevent inmates from taking part in a referendum if the prisoners are deemed to be part of people? In our view they cannot'

Also in **Hirst vs UK** [No.2] [2005] ECHR 681, established,

'That the general, automatic and indiscriminate nature of the restriction on the right meant that the UK's ban on prisoners' voting rights fell outside of the margin of appreciation, and was disproportionate'

I therefore rule that, the right to vote in respect of remandees aged above eighteen years who are citizen of Tanzania, is cherished and enriched in Article 5(1) of the Constitution.

Regarding restriction imposed by the provision of section 11(1)(c) of the National Elections Act, in respect of inmate serving a prison term of six months. It is pertinent at this juncture to highlight on the trite principles of constitutional interpretation as was inunciated in **Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo vs Attorney General** [2004] TLR 1, I quote in extenso,

'We propose, before commencing to examine the correctness or otherwise of counsel's arguments, to

allude to general principles governing constitutional interpretation, which in our opinion, are relevant to the determination of the issues raised by counsel in this appeal. These principles may, in the interests of brevity, be stated as follows. First, the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania is a living instrument, having a soul and consciousness of its own as reflected in the Preamble and Fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy. Courts must, therefore, endeavour to avoid crippling it by construing it technically or in a narrow spirit. It must be construed in tune with the lofty purposes for which its makers framed it. So construed, the instrument becomes a solid foundation of democracy and rule of law. As was correctly stated by Mr. Justice E. O. Ayoola, a former Chief Justice of the Gambia, in his paper presented at a seminar on the Independence of the Judiciary, in Port – Louis, Mauritius, in October 1998:

"A timorous and unimaginative exercise of the judicial power of constitutional interpretation leaves the constitution a stale and sterile document"

Secondly, the provision touching fundamental rights have to be interpreted in a broad and liberal manner, thereby jealously protecting and developing the dimensions of those rights and ensuring that our people enjoy their rights, our young democracy not only functions but also grows, and the will and dominant aspirations of the

people prevail. Restrictions on fundamental rights must be strictly construed.

Thirdly, until the contrary is proved, a legislation is presumed to be constitutional. It is a sound principle of constitutional construction that, if possible a legislation should receive such a construction as will make it operative and not inoperative. Fourthly, since as stated a short while ago, there is a presumption of constitutionality of a legislation, save where a clawback or exclusion clause is relied upon as a basis for constitutionality of the legislation, the onus is upon those who challenge the constitutionality of the legislation; they have to rebut the presumption. Fifthly, where those supporting a restriction on a fundamental right rely on a clawback or exclusion clause in doing so, the onus is on them; they have to justify the restriction'

The manner this provision was crafted, introduces some elements of inconsistence to Article 5(2) of the Constitution. Article 5(2) provide, I quote,

'Bunge laweza kutunga sheria na kuweka masharti yanayoweza kuzuia raia asitumie haki ya kupiga kura kutokana na yoyote kati ya sababu zifuatazo, yaani raia huyo-

a) ...N.A...

b) ...N.A...

c) kutiwa hatiani kwa makosa fulani ya jinai;

d) ...N.A...

mbali na sababu hizo hakuna sababu nyingine yoyote inayoweza kumzuia raia asitumie haki ya kupiga kura'

To my interpretation, the plain meaning of paragraph (c) to sub article (2) of Article 5, the law maker ought to sort out and list category or type of criminal offences whose upon conviction and imposition of jail term or custodial sentence could automatically deny any citizen sentenced unto it, his/her right to vote.

In other words, the Constitution did not meant that anybody sentenced to jail for a certain particular period for whatever kind or category of offence, automatically loose his/her constitution right to vote. To my view, the law maker ought to enact a provision of the law providing for a list of specific offences as opposed to a threshold of a minimum term of imprisonment which is invariably gauged at the discretion of the court for any offence where there is no minimum sentence prescribed by a particular penal statute. Actually what the law maker did was to change a goal post by enacting provisions of the law that will ensure all people jailed for a term of six months or above six months are deprived their rights to vote. What the law maker did amounted to a total departure to the dictate of the letter of the Constitution which intended a specific list

of criminal offences, instead the law maker changed the focus and subjected the restriction to vote to the judicial sentencing process.

To my view, the restriction imposed by the preceding proviso of section 11 (c) of the National Elections Act, is not only in a blanket form as argued by the Petitioners, rather is crafted in a form of sweeping up rubbish to anyone who is send to the prison facility. To say the least, even someone who has been arrested and detained in prison as a civil prisoner for a term of six months in execution of a civil decree under section 46(1)(a) of the Civil Procedure Code, Cap 33 R.E. 2019 (which allow the court where the judgment debtor fail or default to satisfy a decreed sum of money exceeding one hundred shillings, to be detained for as civil prisoner for a period of six months), automatically fall victim to a trap and loses his constitution right to vote, while has never committed or being sentenced for any penal or criminal offence by any court of law. At any rate, this is irritional. In the case of **Julius Ishengoma Francis Ndyanabo vs Attorney General** [2004] TLR 1, the Apex Court had this to say, I quote,

> *'It is of course, for the courts to decide whether a classification adopted by a law is reasonable or not. The judicial antennae must be sensitive to any classification with a view to ensuring that the classification is rational. To be assured of a bright future a country must have its*

foundations of justice and equality is rational. To be assured of bright future a country must have its foundations of justice and equality truly and firmly laid'

For appreciation, I reproduce the provision of section 11(1)(c) of the National Election Act, as hereunder,

'No personal shall be qualified for registration or be registered as a voter under this Act if he is:-

a) ...N.A...

b) ...N.A...

c) under sentence of death imposed by any court in Tanzania or is under a sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months imposed by a court or as substituted by some other sentence imposed by such a court'

In the worst scenario, the above provision does not say if the said sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months covers only those convicted for a criminal offence, neither mention any offence, rather say any one serving a sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months. I therefore hold the view that non mention of specific offences to whom the sentence of imprisonment exceeding six months will be met, render the said provision to be too general, to the extent that there is a possibility for any citizen detained as a civil prisoner serving imprisonment exceeding six months to be entrapped by the above provision.

It is elementary that the only offences which carries death sentence in our penal statute is treason and murder, see sections 39(1) and 197 of the Penal Code, Cap 16 R.E. 2019. In that way, it can be said that imposing restriction to vote to someone sentenced to suffer a death sentence, is somehow by implication, specific. This is because treason and murder are serious offences by nature.

That said, the preceding proviso which impose restriction to registration as a voter to any person serving imprisonment exceeding six months, is too general, irrational and is inconsistent with the Constitution.

Now having declared the said provision unconstitutional, the next recourse is found under Article 64(5) of the Constitution, which provide,

> *'Bila ya kuathiri kutumika kwa Katiba ya Zanzibar kwa mujibu wa katiba hii kuhusu mambo yote ya Tanzania Zanzibar yasiyo Mambo ya Muungano, Katiba hii itakuwa na nguvu ya sheria katika Jamhuri nzima ya Muungano na endapo sheria nyingine yoyote itakiuka masharti yaliyomo katika Katiba, Katiba ndiyo itakuwa na nguvu, na sheria hiyo nyingine, kwa kiasi ilichokiuka itakuwa batili'*

In view of the above, the provision of paragraph (c) to subsection (1) of section 11 of the National Election Act, is hereby declared unconstitutional to the extent of it is inconsistent. Therefore the said provision is void.

The Petitioners also claimed for general damages and pleaded a sum of their own choice amounting to Tsh 100,000,000 alleged for illegal, unlawful and unconstitutional denial of their rights to vote for the general Election 2020 which caused them to suffer mental anguish, inconvenience, stress and pain. As such asked to be remedied by payment of that sum. In submission, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners apportioned equal share of Tsh 50,000,000 to each Petitioner, termed it as compensation to each for breach of their constitutional rights, citing **The Attorney General vs N.I.N. Munuo Ng'uni** [2004] TLR 44, which held,

> *'It is clear that this Court excluded asking specific damages by a mere statement or prayer. But since this is a claim on basic and fundamental rights, from above cited persuasive authorities from sister jurisdictions, we are duty bound to admit a mere statement and prayer in asking for specific damages, like loss of earnings from the practice as an advocate for the 17 months the respondent was suspended'*

But the above case cited is distinguishable to the facts of this case in many aspects: therein a claim was for specific damages, herein is a claim for general damages; therein the specific damages was gauged on loss of earning, herein the Petitioners pleaded to have suffered mental anguish,

inconvenience, embarrassment, stress and pain; therein the respondent's practicing certificate was suspended for a specific period of 17 months without practicing as an advocate, herein Petitioners are merely alleging breach of their constitutional rights. Indeed herein, the Petitioners' petition was supported by affidavit deposition by the duo Petitioners, exhibit P2 and P3. It was expected for them to page and vindicate the particulars for the alleged suffrage claimed off to justify as to why they are entitled to a further redress by way of compensation for a pleaded amount. In exhibit P2 and P3, paragraph ten contain similar facts although the First Petitioner was a remandee and the Second Petitioner a convict. Their deposition was on the following terms,

> *'That I have applied in the petition for pecuniary compensation by way of general damages for the pain; suffering; mental stress and inconvenience as a result of this denial of my rights'*

The manner this statement is couched, it cannot be said for sure it amount to any proof for general damages or at all. Rather it connote that deponents were inferring to have applied for compensation in their petition. It is therefore short of proof. In the premises, a claim for general damages cannot be entertained, it flop.

Having adumbrated as above, it is ruled that, the right to vote in respect of remandees aged above eighteen years who are citizen of Tanzania, is cherished and enriched in Article 5(1) of the Constitution; the provision of paragraph (c) to subsection (1) of section 11 of the National Election Act, is hereby declared unconstitutional to the extent of it is inconsistent and therefore the said provision is void; a claim for general damages Tsh 100,000,000/= is dismissed.

I make no order to costs, given that this petition is on a nature of public litigation.



E.B. Luvanda
Judge
19/12/2022